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Abstract
Objective—To describe obstetrician–gynecologists’ (ob-gyns) views and willingness to help
women seeking abortion in a variety of clinical scenarios.
Methods—We conducted a mailed survey of 1,800 U.S. ob-gyns. We presented seven scenarios
in which patients sought abortion. For each, respondents indicated if they morally objected to
abortion and if they would help patients obtain an abortion. We analyzed predictors of objection
and assistance.
Results—The response rate was 66%. Objection to abortion ranged from 16% (cardiopulmonary
disease) to 82% (sex selection); willingness to assist ranged from 64% (sex selection) to 93%
(cardiopulmonary disease). Excluding sex selection, objection was less likely among ob-gyns who
were female (odds ratio [OR] 0.5, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.4–0.8), urban (OR 0.3, CI 0.1–
0.7), or Jewish (OR 0.3, CI 0.1–0.7) compared to male, rural, or unaffiliated ob-gyns. Objection
was more likely among ob-gyns from the South (OR 1.9, CI 1.2–3.0) or Midwest (OR 1.9, CI 1.2–
3.1), and among Catholic, evangelical Protestant, or Muslim ob-gyns, or those for whom religion
was most important, compared to reference. Among ob-gyns who objected to abortion in a given
case, approximately two-thirds nevertheless help patients obtain an abortion. Excluding sex
selection, assistance despite objection was more likely among female (OR 1.8, CI 1.1–2.9) and
US-born ob-gyns (OR 2.2, CI 1.1–4.7), and less likely among Southern ob-gyns (OR 0.3, CI 0.2–
0.6), or those for whom religion was most important (OR 0.3, CI 0.1–0.7).
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Conclusions—Most ob-gyns help patients obtain an abortion even when they morally object to
abortion in that case. Willingness to assist varies by clinical context and physician characteristics.
Ethicists, clinicians, and policy-makers debate the role of conscientious refusals in medical
practice. Recently, the Obama administration rescinded a Bush administration rule that
would have required every health care entity receiving federal funding to certify that none of
its employees were required to assist in any way with medical services that would violate
that employee’s “individual moral beliefs or religious convictions”(1,2). At the same time,
the administration affirmed a 1973 federal law that states that a health care worker cannot be
required to participate in abortion or sterilization procedures that conflict with “his [sic]
religious beliefs or moral convictions”(3).
These debates about federal regulations are part of broader debates about conscience in
healthcare (4). Some bioethicists argue that physicians who refuse to provide legal and
professionally permitted services should leave the profession (5); others argue that
physicians have a basic obligation and right to act in accordance with their moral
convictions (6). Most professional medical organizations endorse a limited right of refusal,
balanced against patients’ interests and professional obligations (7)(8). Previous studies
suggest that the majority of physicians agree that doctors may not be obligated to provide an
intervention to which they have a moral objection (9), but that they are obligated to refer
patients for interventions they are unwilling to provide themselves (10)(11).
Obstetrician-gynecologists (ob-gyns) find themselves at the center of these debates, because
many practices in women’s health and reproductive medicine generate controversy,
including, of course, abortion. Little is known about how ob-gyns view abortion, morally
speaking, or how their views influence the care they provide. In order to describe ob-gyns’
views and willingness to help women seeking abortion in a variety of clinical scenarios, we
analyzed data from a national survey of practicing ob-gyns.
Methods
From October 2008 until January 2009, we mailed a confidential, self-administered
questionnaire to a stratified random sample consisting of 1800 US general ob-gyns, 65 years
of age or younger (from a universe of 34,689 ob-gyns) in the American Medical Association
Physician Masterfile. The questionnaire addressed a variety of practices in sexual and
reproductive healthcare, including abortion. Sample size was chosen to yield a margin of
error of < 3% for a dichotomous variable that is distributed 50% in the population. To
increase religious minority representation, we used validated ethnic surname lists to create
four strata, and oversampled in these strata (12)(13)(14). Physicians received up to three
separate mailings of the questionnaire; the first included $20, and the third offered an
additional $30 for participating. Physicians also received an advance letter and a postcard
reminder after the first questionnaire mailing. All data were double-keyed, cross-compared,
and corrected against the original questionnaire. The study was approved by the University
of Chicago Institutional Review Board. Methods for this study have been described in depth
elsewhere (15).
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In one section of the questionnaire, respondents were presented with seven scenarios in
which a patient sought an abortion, and were asked to indicate whether they: 1) have any
ethical or moral objection to abortion in each case (Yes/No); and 2) would help the patient
obtain an abortion if asked, either by providing the abortion themselves or referring the
patient to someone who would (Yes/No). We defined assistance as either provision or
referral, because although providing abortion and referring for abortion are not equivalent,
current ethical debates center on whether ob-gyns are required to refer for or otherwise help
patients obtain an abortion when asked. The seven scenarios were: a) a 22-year-old single
woman 6 weeks pregnant after failed hormonal contraception (hereafter failed
contraception); b) a 38-year-old with five daughters and no sons, after chorionic villus
sampling reveals the fetus is a chromosomally normal female (sex selection); c) a 36-year-
old in the first trimester of pregnancy who needs radiation and chemotherapy for newly
diagnosed breast cancer (breast cancer); d) a 28-year-old with type I diabetes, for whom
glucose management has become very difficult at 16 weeks’ gestation (difficult-to-control
diabetes); e) a 34-year-old woman six weeks pregnant after being raped (rape); f) selective
reduction in a healthy 37-year-old with a quintuplet pregnancy (selective reduction); and g)
a 24-year-old with a cardiopulmonary abnormality associated with a 25% chance of death
with gestation (cardiopulmonary disease). Demographic covariates included physician age,
sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, number of children, whether they were US-born,
geographic region, urbanicity of location (measured as the proportion of people in the
physician’s zip code that live in an urban area), religious affiliation, importance of religion
in the respondent’s life, and membership in the American Congress of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG).
Stratum weights were incorporated to account for the oversampling in the ethnic surname
strata and to correct for differences in response rates observed among the surname categories
and between U.S. and foreign medical school graduates, as described in previous reports on
this data (15). By incorporating stratum weights, we are able to generate estimates for the
population of U.S. ob-gyns. After generating population estimates for responses to each
item, we used survey-design-adjusted multivariable logistic regression to identify
independent predictors of moral objection to one or more scenarios. Because significant
predictors were different for sex selection compared to other scenarios, we repeated this
analysis for the scenario sex selection alone, and for objecting to one or more scenarios,
excluding sex selection. Finally, we analyzed the prevalence and predictors of being willing
to help a patient obtain an abortion despite having a moral objection to abortion in that case
(assistance despite objection). All analyses were adjusted for survey design and were
conducted using Stata MP software, v11.1.
Results
The response rate was 66% (1154/1760) after excluding 40 potential respondents who were
retired or who could not be located after two attempts to obtain a valid address. The
response rate varied by stratum, and graduates of foreign medical schools were less likely to
respond than graduates of US medical schools (58% vs. 68%, p=0.001). Response rate did
not differ significantly by age, sex, region, or board certification. Respondents’ demographic
characteristics are reported in Table 1.
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The percentage of physicians with moral objection to abortion varied substantially by
clinical case (Table 2). The majority (82%) of ob-gyns objected in the case of sex selection,
but fewer than half objected in the other scenarios: 43% for the case of difficult-to-control
diabetes; 41% for failed contraception; 29% for selective reduction; 20% for rape, 18% for
breast cancer, and 16% for cardiopulmonary disease. Overall (excluding sex selection) 50%
objected to one or more scenarios.
Across scenarios, most ob-gyns were willing to help patients obtain an abortion. As seen in
Table 2, 64% would help a patient obtain an abortion for sex selection, and ≥80% would
help in a patient obtain an abortion in each of the other scenarios. Overall, 60% would help a
patient obtain an abortion in all scenarios; 35% would help in some scenarios, and 5%
would help in none of the scenarios. When the case of sex selection was excluded, those
percentages were 76%, 19% and 5% respectively.
Table 3 presents the adjusted odds ratios for reporting a moral objection to abortion in one
or more scenarios, in the scenario of sex selection alone, and in one or more scenarios
excluding sex selection. Odds ratios are adjusted for all variables in the table. Considering
all seven scenarios, objection was less likely among black ob-gyns (OR 0.4, 95% CI 0.2–
0.9) and Jewish ob-gyns (OR 0.5, 95% CI 0.2–1.0) compared to whites and those without
religious affiliation. Compared to ob-gyns for whom religion was not very/not at all
important, objection was more likely among ob-gyns for whom religion was very important
(OR, 2.0, 95% CI 1.1–3.4) or most important (OR 6.3, 95% CI 2.3–17.6) in their lives.
Significant covariates were different for objection to sex selection alone and objection to one
or more cases other than sex selection. Objection to sex selection was more likely among
Midwest ob-gyns (OR 1.9, 95% CI 1.1–3.5), Muslims (OR 4.4, 95% CI 1.0–18.8) and
respondents for whom religion was very important (OR 2.2; 95% CI 1.3–3.8) or most
important in their life (OR 6.1, 95% CI 2.3–15.8) compared to their respective reference
groups. Objection to sex selection was less likely among black (OR 0.4, 95% CI 0.2–0.9),
Jewish (OR 0.5, 95% CI 0.2–0.9) and older (OR.98, 95% CI 0.95–0.99) respondents.
Excluding sex selection, objection in one or more scenarios was less likely among women
(OR 0.5; 95% CI 0.4–0.8), Jewish (OR 0.3; 95% CI 0.1–0.7), older (OR 0.96, 95% CI 0.94–.
98) and more urban (OR 0.3, 95% CI 0.1–0.7) ob-gyns compared to respective reference
groups. Objection was more likely among those practicing in the South (OR 1.9, 95% CI
1.2–3.0) or Midwest (OR 1.9; 95% CI 1.2–3.1), who had Catholic (OR 2.7, 95% CI 1.4–
5.1), Evangelical Protestant (OR 3.7, 95% CI 1.4–10.0) or Muslim (OR 3.4, 95% CI 1.2–
9.6) affiliation, or who indicated religion was fairly (OR 1.7, 95% CI 1.1–2.8), very (OR
3.6; 95% CI 2.2–5.9) or most (OR 16.9, 95% CI 7.7–37.1) important in their life compared
to reference groups. Marital status, number of children, ACOG membership, or being US-
born was not associated with objection to abortion.
For each clinical scenario, approximately two-thirds of ob-gyns who object to abortion in
that case would still assist the patient to obtain an abortion: 57% in cases of sex selection
and difficult-to-control diabetes; 64% in cases of rape and selective reduction, 65% in the
case of failed contraception; 67% in the case of breast cancer, and 70% in the case of heart
disease. Overall, 55% would assist patients in all scenarios to which they have a moral
objection to abortion, 18% would assist in some scenarios but not others, and 26% would
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not assist in any scenario to which they had an objection. Excluding the sex selection case,
those percentages were 58%, 17% and 23%, respectively.
Table 4 displays the adjusted odds of being willing to assist despite objection in: one or
more cases in which one has a moral objection; in the case of sex selection alone; and in one
or more scenarios when sex selection was excluded. Considering all scenarios, assistance
despite objection was more likely among Jewish ob-gyns (OR 3.0; 95% CI 1.4–6.5) and less
likely among older ob-gyns (OR 0.98, 95% CI 0.95–0.99), ob-gyns from the South (OR 0.6,
95% CI 0.4–1.0), or ob-gyns for whom religion was most important (OR 0.4, 95% CI 0.2–
0.7) compared to their respective reference groups. We observed similar demographic
predictors of assistance despite objection when we examined the sex selection case alone.
Considering all cases except sex selection, female ob-gyns were more likely to assist despite
objection than male ob-gyns (OR 1.8; 95% CI 1.1–2.9) as were US born ob-gyns compared
to those born outside of the US (OR 2.2, 95% CI 1.1–4.7). Southern ob-gyns were less likely
to assist despite objection (OR 0.3, 95% CI 0.2–0.6), as were those who said that religion
was most important in their life (OR 0.3; 95% CI 0.1–0.7).
We conducted a separate analysis of the 194 respondents who indicated that they perform
abortions. Sixty-five percent (95%CI, 57–72%) objected to abortion for sex selection, but
81% (95%CI, 75–88%) were willing to assist despite objection. Otherwise, abortion
providers morally objected to abortion at low rates: 4% (95%CI, 0–8%) in failed
contraception; <1% in the case of breast cancer; 8% (95%CI, 4–13%) for diabetes; 2%
(95%CI, 0–4%) in the setting of rape; 3% (95%CI, 0–6%) for selective reduction, and <1%
for a potentially fatal cardiopulmonary anomaly. Most assisted – 81%–100%, depending
upon the scenario). Seventy percent of abortion providers assist despite objection in all
scenarios (95%CI, 61–80%), 3% in some scenarios (95%CI, 0–6%), and 27% (95%CI, 17–
36%) in no scenarios. When the sex selection case was excluded, very few (n=16) abortion
providers with objections remained in the sample. Among these, 11 assist despite objection
in all scenarios, 1 in some, and 4 in none.
Discussion
In this national survey, we found that the context in which a woman seeks abortion matters
to many ob-gyns—both to their judgments about the morality of abortion and to whether
they will help a woman obtain the abortion she seeks. These findings contrast with public
debates about the ethics of abortion, which often focus only on the moral status of the fetus:
if the fetus is a person, then abortion is the moral equivalent of murder; if the fetus is not a
person, abortion may be permissible. These data suggest that ob-gyns also consider
contextual factors, including risk of physical harm to the woman by continuing pregnancy
(breast cancer, cardiopulmonary disease), the circumstances of the sexual encounter that
resulted in pregnancy (rape), the impact abortion may have on pregnancy outcome (selective
reduction), the potential for fetal anomaly (diabetes), and the duration of pregnancy (second
versus first trimester). Ob-gyns may be more likely to object to abortion when they believe
that the health risks of pregnancy can be mitigated with careful medical management (e.g.,
in diabetes); when the patient had the capacity to prevent the pregnancy with better
compliance with contraception; or when the request for abortion is motivated by unjustified
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prejudice (e.g., sex selection). However, that context matters raises concerns that
socioeconomic, racial, or other power imbalances might result in inequities in meaningful
access to abortion: to the extent a woman’s reasons for seeking abortion are relevant, ob-
gyns are in the position of determining if those reasons are “good enough.”
In addition to context, physician characteristics matter, in that they are associated with
objecting to and being willing to help a patient obtain abortion. Apart from the case of sex
selection, female ob-gyns are less likely to object to abortion than their male counterparts.
When they do object, women are more likely to assist despite their objections. Nearly 30
years ago psychologist Carol Gilligan found that men tend to mediate moral decisions by
using universal principles or well-defined rules, while women are more likely to make moral
decisions by appealing to context, particularity, and relationships (16). Our data show that
apart from sex selection, male ob-gyns were less likely to assist despite objection, consistent
with a more rule or principle-oriented view that abortion is either acceptable or not. Female
ob-gyns on the other hand were more likely to assist when they objected. They may
experience abortion as simultaneously objectionable and acceptable, depending on nuances
of the particular clinical context.
Geographic variations in objection and assistance despite objection highlight concerns that
ob-gyns’ refusals to help patients obtain a requested abortion contribute to unequal access to
abortion services (7). For example, despite the fact that refusals of abortion services have the
potential to significantly impact patient access to abortion more in rural areas where there
are fewer providers, working in a more rural setting was not associated with willingness to
assist despite objection. With respect to religion, aside from the case of sex selection,
religious affiliation was not independently associated with assistance despite objection,
whereas physician religiosity was. This suggests that the lived experience of religion shapes
ob-gyns’ decisions about abortion more than religious affiliation per se.
One way to interpret these findings is that most (but not all) ob-gyns embrace what has been
called the “conventional compromise” regarding conscientious refusals (17). According to
Brock, the conventional compromise holds that if a physician has a conscientious objection
to a legal and professionally permitted medical intervention, under certain circumstances the
physician may not be obligated to provide the intervention, but he or she is obligated to refer
to someone who will. However, sometimes a physician might consider even referring the
patient to be immoral; indeed, a recent study found that 43% of US physicians do not
believe doctors are obligated to refer in such cases (14).
Of note, while current debates tend to attach the term “conscientious” only to refusals to
provide or refer for abortion, these data suggest that providing or helping a patient obtain an
abortion can also be a conscientious act—an act done with due moral consideration and
done even in the face of personal moral objection to abortion (18). Our data further suggest
that acting “conscientiously” does not necessarily mean providing only medical
interventions to which one has no moral objections. This study includes both ob-gyns who
object to abortion but nevertheless help a woman obtain one, and ob-gyns who generally
support abortion – even provide abortion – but who would not help a patient obtain an
abortion for sex selection. Whether conscientious provisions or refusals of abortion care are
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ethical is the subject of ongoing debate, even among the authors of this study. Either way,
these findings point to an understanding of conscience as a capacity that judges the moral
quality of one’s actions, (19) all things considered (20).
Finally, public discourse sometimes makes it seem as if there are only two categories of
providers in the US with respect to abortion: those who do not object to abortion, and
therefore assist women seeking abortion, or those who oppose abortion and do not. In
contrast, our data indicate at least two further categories: ob-gyns who oppose abortion in
general but still find it acceptable sometimes, and those who support abortion in general—
even provide it—but still find it unacceptable sometimes. Ongoing debates about abortion
should take note of these nuances regarding abortion practices.
This study has several limitations. We did not ask about other common situations in which
patients might seek abortion, including situations in which contraception was not used, in
which the patient faces financial hardships, in which women’s work or educational goals led
to the decision to seek abortion, or in which a patient seeks an abortion in the setting of fetal
anomaly. In addition, trimester of pregnancy was not uniformly identified in case scenarios,
so we cannot be sure the extent to which ob-gyns’ responses reflected their inferences
regarding the duration of pregnancy in each scenario. We used the zip codes of physicians’
primary mailing address, which might be a home address and might not represent the level
of urbanicity of the zip code in which they practice. Finally, as is characteristic of studies
such as ours, data may not reflect how physicians practice in real life; further, non-
respondents may differ from respondents in ways that bias the findings.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study has important implications for understanding
the relationship between physicians’ personal moral views and the clinical care they provide.
Among ob-gyns, support for abortion varies widely depending on the context in which
abortion is sought and physician characteristics. Furthermore, most ob-gyns assist a patient
seeking abortion even when they object to abortion in that patient’s case. A broader
appreciation of the moral considerations that shape physician decisions will be critical to
shaping practice guidelines and public policy that both meet patients’ needs and promote
moral integrity among the physicians who care for them.
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Age, mean (SD) 47.8 9.2 SD
Percent urban†, median (1st, 3rd quartiles) 99.9 91.4, 1
Female sex 537 (46)
 Region
  Northeast 288 (25)
  South 373 (32)
  Midwest 249 (22)
  West 242 (21)
 Race/Ethnicity
  Asian 202 (18)
  Hispanic or Latino 64 (6)
  Black, non-Hispanic 67 (6)
  White, non-Hispanic 774 (68)
  Other 22 (2)
 Marital Status
  Married 965 (84)
  Single/Divorced/Widowed 178 (16)
 Children
  None 162 (14)
  1 or more 973 (86)
 Immigration History
  Born in the USA 817 (72)
  Immigrated to USA as a child or adult 323 (28)
 Religious affiliation
 None 119 (11)
  Hindu 91 (8)
  Jewish 160 (14)
  Muslim 54 (5)
  Roman Catholic/Eastern Orthodox 262 (23)
  Protestant, Evangelical 91 (8)
  Protestant, Non- Evangelical 300 (27)
  Other Religion 48 (4)
 Importance of religion in life
  Most important 157 (14)
  Very important 385 (34)
  Fairly important 321 (28)
  Not very important 272 (24)
  ACOG Member 1052 (92)
*
Total sample size is 1,152. Some groups add up to less than that number because of missing responses. Numbers and percentages are unweighted.
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†
Percent Urban was obtained from 2000 Census data linked to zipcodes. It is calculated as the total population in a zipcode living in an urban area
divided by the total population in that zipcode.
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Table 2
The percentage of US Ob/Gyns [lsqb]N = 1154[rsqb] that reports moral objection to abortion, and willingness
to help patients obtain abortion, in seven hypothetical clinical scenarios
Clinical Scenario Do you morally object
to abortion in this
case? (Yes)




N (%) N (%)
(95% CI) (95% CI)
A. A 22-year-old single woman 6 weeks pregnant after failed hormonal contraception 420 (41) 970 (85)
(38–44) (82–87)
B. A 38 year old with five daughters and no sons, after chorionic villus testing at 10
weeks gestation reveals the fetus is a chromosomally normal female
923 (82) 719 (64)
(80–85) (61–67)
C. A 36 year old in the first trimester of pregnancy who needs radiation and
chemotherapy for newly diagnosed breast cancer
178 (18) 1046 (91)
(16–21) (89–93)
D. A 28 year old with brittle type 1 diabetes, for whom glucose management has
become very difficult at 16 weeks gestation
445 (43) 915 (80)
(40–46) (78–83)
E. A 34-year-old woman 6 weeks pregnant after being raped 206 (20) 1041 (91)
(18–23) (89–93)
F. Selective reduction in a healthy 37-year-old patient with quintuplet pregnancy 294 (29) 1001 (88)
(26–32) (86–90)
G. A 24 year old with a cardiopulmonary abnormality associated with a 25% chance of
death with gestation
155 (16) 1060 (93)
(14–18) (91–95)
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Table 3
Adjusted odds of reporting a moral objection to abortion in one or more scenarios, in the case of sex selection,
and in one or more scenarios other than sex selection, by physician characteristics
Object
To one or more scenarios To sex selection To one or more scenarios other than sex
selection
OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Characteristic
Age, yrs .98 (.95–1.0) .98 (.95–.99)* .96 (0.94–.98)*
Female sex 1.3 (0.9–2.0) 1.2 (0.8–1.8) 0.5 (0.4–0.8)*
Race/Ethnicity
 White, non- Hispanic Referent Referent Referent
 Black, non- Hispanic 0.4 (0.2–0.9)* 0.4 (0.2–0.9)* 0.8 (0.4–1.6)
 Asian 0.7 (0.3–1.5) 0.8 (0.4–1.6) 0.7 (0.3–1.3)
 Hispanic/Latino 0.5 (0.2–1.1) 0.6 (0.3–1.3) 0.7 (0.3–1.4)
 Other 1.4 (0.4–4.9) 1.7 (0.5–6.1) 1.0 (0.1–10.0)
Married 1.2 (0.7–2.0) 1.4 (0.8–2.3) 1.1 (0.6–1.8)
Children 1.4 (0.8–2.6) 1.3 (0.7–2.3) 1.5 (0.9–2.6)
US born 1.0 (0.5–1.8) 1.3 (0.7–2.3) 0.8 (0.4–1.3)
Region
 Northeast Referent Referent Referent
 South 1.8 (1.1–3.1)* 1.6 (1.0–2.7) 1.9 (1.2–3.0)*
 idwest 1.9 (1.1–3.4)* 1.9 (1.1–3.5)* 1.9 (1.2–3.1)*
 West 0.9 (0.6–1.6) 0.8 (0.5–1.3) 1.3 (0.8–2.1)
Religious affiliation
 None Referent Referent Referent
 Hindu 0.5 (0.2–1.4) 0.6 (0.2–1.6) 1.0 (0.4–2.8)
 Jewish 0.5 (0.2–1.0)* 0.5 (0.2–0.9)* 0.3 (0.1–0.7)*
 Muslim 2.7 (0.7–10.3) 4.4 (1.0–18.8)* 3.4 (1.2–9.6)*
 Roman 1.5 (0.8–3.1) 1.3 (0.7–2.6) 2.7 (1.4–5.1)*
Catholic/Eastern Orthodox
 Protestant, Evangelical 2.6 (0.8–8.8) 2.7 (0.8–9.3) 3.7 (1.4–10.0)*
 Protestant, Non– Evangelical 1.4 (0.7–2.7) 1.4 (0.8–2.8) 1.7 (0.9–3.2)
 Other Religion Importance of religion in life 0.7 (0.2–1.8) 0.6 (0.2–1.6) 0.8 (0.3–2.2)
 Not very/not at all important Referent Referent Referent
 Fairly important 1.6 (1.0–2.6) 1.7 (1.0–2.8) 1.7 (1.1–2.8)*
 Very important 2.0 (1.1–3.4)* 2.2 (1.3–3.8)* 3.6 (2.2–5.9)*
 Most important 6.3 (2.3–17.6)* 6.1 (2.3–15.8)* 16.9 (7.7–37.1)*
 ACOG Member 1.0 (0.5–2.0) 1.0 (0.5–2.0) 0.7 (0.4–1.3)
 Percent Urban 1.5 (0.5–4.9) 1.7 (0.6–5.2) 0.3 (0.1–0.7)*
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Table presents results of multivariable logistic regression analyses that adjust for all variables in the table.
*
p[lt].05
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Table 4
Adjusted odds of being willing to assist in all scenarios objected to, in the case of objecting to sex selection,
and in all scenarios objected to other than sex selection, by physician characteristics
Willing to assist despite objection
All scenarios Sex selection All scenarios other than sex selection
OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)
Characteristic
Age, yrs .98 (.95–.99)* .98 (.95–.99)* .99 (.96–1.02)
Female sex 1.3 (0.9–1.8) 1.3 (0.9–1.8) 1.8 (1.1–2.9)*
Race/Ethnicity
 White, non- Hispanic Referent Referent Referent
 Black, non- Hispanic 0.6 (0.3–1.2) 0.6 (0.3–1.2) 0.7 (0.3–1.4)
Asian 1.1 (0.6–2.1) 1.2 (0.6–2.5) 1.6 (0.6–4.3)
 Hispanic/Latino 1.0 (0.5–2.1) 1.2 (0.5–2.5) 1.6 (0.6–4.3)
 Other 1.9 (0.3–10.6) 4.8 (1.0–22.4)* 0.6 (0.1–4.5)
Married 0.8 (0.5–1.3) 0.7 (0.4–1.2) 0.9 (0.5–1.7)
Children 0.6 (0.3–1.1) 0.6 (0.3–1.1) 0.6 (0.3–1.4)
US born 1.2 (0.7–1.9) 1.0 (0.6–1.7) 2.2 (1.1–4.7)*
Region
 Northeast Referent Referent Referent
 South 0.6 (0.4–1.0)* 0.6 (0.4–0.9)* 0.3 (0.2–0.6)*
 Midwest 0.7 (0.4–1.2) 0.7 (0.4–1.2) 0.5 (0.3–1.1)
 West 1.1 (0.7–1.8) 1.1 (0.6–1.8) 0.8 (0.4–1.7)
Religious affiliation
 None Referent Referent Referent
 Hindu 0.6 (0.2–2.1) 0.5 (0.1–1.7) 3.0 (0.5–17.3)
 Jewish 3.0 (1.4–6.5)* 2.9 (1.3–6.5)* 2.5 (0.5–13.3)
 Muslim 0.8 (0.3–2.1) 0.7 (0.3–1.9) 0.8 (0.2–3.5)
 Roman 1.4 (0.7–2.7) 1.4 (0.7–2.7) 1.1 (0.4–3.5)
Catholic/Eastern Orthodox
 Protestant, Evangelical 0.9 (0.4–2.0) 1.1 (0.5–2.6) 1.0 (0.3–3.4)
 Protestant, Non- Evangelical 1.5 (0.8–2.9) 1.5 (0.8–3.0) 1.2 (0.4–3.9)
 Other Religion 0.6 (0.2–1.8) 0.6 (0.2–1.9) 1.0 (0.2–5.2)
Importance of religion in life
Not very/not at all important Referent Referent Referent
 Fairly important 1.0 (0.6–1.7) 1.0 (0.6–1.7) 1.0 (0.4–2.3)
 Very important 0.7 (0.4–1.2) 0.7 (0.4–1.2) 0.6 (0.3–1.3)
 Most important 0.4 (0.2–0.7)* 0.4 (0.2–0.7)* 0.3 (0.1–0.7)*
 ACOG Member 1.2 (0.7–2.1) 1.2 (0.7–2.2) 1.1 (0.5–2.1)
 Percent Urban 1.4 (0.5–3.7) 1.1 (0.4–2.9) 1.1 (0.4–3.2)
Table presents results of multivariable logistic regression analyses that adjust for all variables in the table.
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*
p[lt].05
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